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Inflation And Central Bank Independence: A Meta-Regression Analysis

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  • Jeroen Klomp
  • Jakob de Haan

Abstract

Using 59 studies, we perform a meta-regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence (CBI). The studies considered are very different with respect to the CBI indicator used, the sample of countries and time periods covered, model specification, estimators used and publication outlet. We conclude that there is a significant publication bias. However, we also find a significant genuine effect of CBI on inflation. Differences between studies are not caused by differences in CBI indicators used. Copyright � 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 24 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (09)
Pages: 593-621

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:24:y:2010:i:4:p:593-621

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Cited by:
  1. Roman Horváth & Jakub Matějů, 2011. "How Are Inflation Targets Set?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 265-300, 06.
  2. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & John Hassler & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Ákos Valentinyi & Xavier Vives, 2012. "Chapter 1: Macroeconomic Outlook," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 17-56, 02.
  3. Levieuge, Grégory & Lucotte, Yannick, 2012. "A simple empirical measure of central banks' conservatism," MPRA Paper 46836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Michael Parkin, 2013. "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy Outcomes: A Three Decade Perspective," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20131, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  5. Jens Klose, 2011. "Political Business Cycles and Monetary Policy Revisited – An Application of a Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Taylor Reaction Function," Ruhr Economic Papers 0286, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  6. Arnone, Marco & Romelli, Davide, 2013. "Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 385-398.
  7. Jane Bogoev & Goran Petrevski & Bruno S. Sergi, 2012. "Investigating the Link Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 50(4), pages 78-96, July.
  8. Mark Mietzner & Dirk Schiereck, 2011. "Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 92-100, 02.
  9. Michael Parkin, 2013. "The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting on Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20133, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  10. Hielscher, Kai & Markwardt, Gunther, 2012. "The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 286-301.
  11. Paul Cavelaars & Jakob de Haan & Paul Hilbers & Bart Stellinga, 2013. "Challenges for financial sector supervision," DNB Occasional Studies 1106, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Bumann, Silke & Hermes, Niels & Lensink, Robert, 2013. "Financial liberalization and economic growth: A meta-analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 255-281.
  13. Michael Parkin, 2014. "The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting on Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments," Working Paper Series 11_14, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  14. T.D. Stanley, 2013. "Does economics add up? An introduction to meta-regression analysis," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar, vol. 10(2), pages 207-220.
  15. Schwäbe, Carsten, 2013. "Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik: Warum die Europäische Zentralbank ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht verloren hat," CIW Discussion Papers 3/2013, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).

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