The Anti Inflationary Influence of Corporatist Structures and Central Bank Independence: The Importance of the Hump Shaped Hypothesis
AbstractMany studies have found strong negative correlations between central bank independence and inflation but the casual significance of this relationship is often challenged. The authors find that the negative relationship remains even when a number of other explanatory variables are considered. Special attention is given to the role of corporatism. Following L. Calmfors and J. Driffill (1988) it is argued that both high and low levels of centralization should be associated with lower inflation. The authors present empirical support for this hump-shaped hypothesis and find that the inclusion of corporatism does not diminish the significance of central bank independence. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 84 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
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