The Anti Inflationary Influence of Corporatist Structures and Central Bank Independence: The Importance of the Hump Shaped Hypothesis
AbstractMany studies have found strong negative correlations between central bank independence and inflation but the casual significance of this relationship is often challenged. The authors find that the negative relationship remains even when a number of other explanatory variables are considered. Special attention is given to the role of corporatism. Following L. Calmfors and J. Driffill (1988) it is argued that both high and low levels of centralization should be associated with lower inflation. The authors present empirical support for this hump-shaped hypothesis and find that the inclusion of corporatism does not diminish the significance of central bank independence. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 84 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniels, Joseph P. & Nourzad, Farrokh & VanHoose, David D., 2006.
"Openness, centralized wage bargaining, and inflation,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 969-988, December.
- Joseph P. Daniels & Farrokh Nourzad & David D. VanHoose, 2005. "Openness, Centralized Wage Bargaining, and Inflation," Working Papers and Research 0505, Marquette University, Center for Global and Economic Studies and Department of Economics.
- Hein, Eckhard, 1999.
"Zentralbank-Politik und makroökonomische Ergebnisse: eine sozio-institutionelle Interpretation
[Central Bank Policies and Macroeconomic Results: A Socio-institutional Interpretation]," MPRA Paper 18881, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Franzese, 2001. "Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 457-486, December.
- Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
- Hein, Eckhard, 2001.
"Institutions and Macroeconomic Performance: Central Bank Independence, Labour Market Institutions and the Perspectives for Inflation and Employment in the European Monetary Union,"
18880, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hein, Eckhard, 2001. "Institutions and macroeconomic performance: Central bank independence, labour market institutions and the perspectives for inflation and employment in the European Monetary Union," WSI Discussion Papers 95, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.