Анализ Независимости Центральных Банков Рф, Стран Снг И Восточной Европы
[Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries]
AbstractOn the basis of an overview of theoretical and empirical studies on central banks’ independence, the paper assesses the independence of the central banks of the former USSR republics including the RF, as well as those of East European countries. An analysis of the potential existence of a relationship between the banks’ independence and some major economic indices, such as inflation, economic activity, and budget deficit, was also performed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33595.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
central bank independence; inflation; budget deficit;
Other versions of this item:
- Pavel Trunin & Kniazev Dmitriy & Satdarov Alexandr, 2010. "Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 133P.
- C43 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Index Numbers and Aggregation
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
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