Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Corporatism, Partisanship, and Alternative Indices of Central Bank Independence
AbstractA well-developed theoretical literature suggests that central bank independence causes low inflation. Empirical work supporting this hypothesis is unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons: statistical analysis has only recently begun to include control variables, and important political variables that are related to inflation have not yet been included; analysis has not yet undertaken a systematic comparison of alternative indices of central bank independence. This paper addresses both weaknesses by testing the explanatory power of eight indices of central bank independence in a political-economic model of inflation. The results suggest that while support for the central bank independence hypothesis survives a relatively inclusive set of control variables, support for the hypothesis is not independent of the particular index upon which analysis relies. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 98 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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