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Measuring central bank independence: a latent variables approach

Author

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  • Jakob De Haan
  • Erik Leertouwer
  • Erik Meijer
  • Tom Wansbeek

Abstract

We argue that central bank independence (CBI) is a latent variable of which the various existing quantifications are imperfect indicators. We show how factor analysis techniques can be employed to assess the quality of the various indicators, and how an optimal weighting of the indicators can be obtained that gives the best approximation of CBI. We also show how these results can be utilized in models in which CBI is an explanatory variable. In contrast to the well‐known study of Campillo and Miron (1997), we find that our CBI indicator is significantly related to inflation, also when various control variables are included.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob De Haan & Erik Leertouwer & Erik Meijer & Tom Wansbeek, 2003. "Measuring central bank independence: a latent variables approach," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(3), pages 326-340, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:3:p:326-340
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.5003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Romer, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903.
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    4. Meijer, Erik & Wansbeek, Tom, 2000. "Measurement error in a single regressor," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 277-284, December.
    5. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1992. "Central bank independence : Criteria and indices," Other publications TiSEM 739426b2-dc3c-40b2-ae90-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    7. Helge Berger & Jakob De Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
    8. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. J. De Haan & W. Kooi, 1997. "What really matters: conservativeness or independence?," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 50(200), pages 23-38.
    10. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
    11. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    12. Cristina T. Terra, 1998. "Openness and Inflation: A New Assessment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 641-648.
    13. Lane, Philip R., 1997. "Inflation in open economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 327-347, May.
    14. repec:dgr:rugsom:00f14 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. James Forder, 1999. "Central Bank Independence: Reassessing the Measurements," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 23-40, March.
    16. White, Halbert, 1982. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 1-25, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Erik Meijer & Susann Rohwedder & Tom Wansbeek, 2008. "Prediction of Latent Variables in a Mixture of Structural Equation Models, with an Application to the Discrepancy Between Survey and Register Data," Working Papers 584, RAND Corporation.
    2. Erik Leertouwer & Jakob de Haan & Jakob de Haan, 2002. "How to Use Indicators for 'Corporatism' in Empirical Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series 728, CESifo.
    3. Posso, Alberto & Tawadros, George B., 2013. "Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 244-247.
    4. C. Hueng, 2012. "Central Bank Behavior and Statutory Independence," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 40(2), pages 111-126, June.
    5. repec:dgr:rugsom:05f10 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Erik Meijer & Edward Oczkowski & Tom Wansbeek, 2021. "How measurement error affects inference in linear regression," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 131-155, January.
    7. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob De Haan, 2010. "Inflation And Central Bank Independence: A Meta‐Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 593-621, September.
    8. Erik Meijer & Susann Rohwedder & Tom Wansbeek, 2008. "Prediction of Latent Variables in a Mixture of Structural Equation Models, with an Application to the Discrepancy Between Survey and Register Data," Working Papers WR-584, RAND Corporation.
    9. Gilbert, Paul D. & Meijer, Erik, 2005. "Time Series Factor Analysis with an Application to Measuring Money," Research Report 05F10, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    10. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2009. "Is the political system really related to health?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 36-46, July.
    11. Andreas Freytag & Simon Renaud, 2007. "From short-term to long-term orientation—political economy of the policy reform process," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 433-449, August.
    12. Weymark, Diana N., 2007. "Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
    13. Philipp F. M. Baumann & Enzo Rossi & Alexander Volkmann, 2020. "What Drives Inflation and How: Evidence from Additive Mixed Models Selected by cAIC," Papers 2006.06274, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    14. M. Pilar Muñoz & Cristina Corchero & F.-Javier Heredia, 2013. "Improving Electricity Market Price Forecasting with Factor Models for the Optimal Generation Bid," International Statistical Review, International Statistical Institute, vol. 81(2), pages 289-306, August.
    15. Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Bruno Sergi, 2012. "The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 611-652.

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