The Case for Central Bank Independence
AbstractThis paper reviews arguments for central bank independence and presents new evidence on the impact of central bank (in)dependence on the level and variability of inflation, money growth, the level and financing of government budget deficits and economic growth, using three different measures of central bank independence. There are indications that countries with an independent central bank experience a lower and more stable inflation rate than countries with a central bank which comes under direct political control. Moreover, central bank credit to government and government budget deficits are lower, while economic growth is not directly affected by central bank independence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
Volume (Year): 45 (1992)
Issue (Month): 182 ()
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Web page: http://www.economiacivile.it
Other versions of this item:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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