The Political Economy of Inflation: Bargaining Structure or Central Bank Independence? Erratum
AbstractThe causes of inflation are commonly analyzed as the function of either the organization of wage bargaining or the independence of the central bank. Although these explanations are widely treated as competing, recent evidence suggests that there may be merit to both arguments. This paper presents a game-theoretic model of wage bargaining and monetary policy-making that shows why the two institutional causes are not only complementary, but elements of a more encompassing logic. The empirical superiority of this synthesizing model is demonstrated by reanalyzing data used in Al-Marhubi and Willett (1995) and by presenting new evidence. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 101 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Vaubel, Roland, 1999. "The Future of the Euro : A Public Choice Perspective," Discussion Papers 570, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
- Joseph P. Daniels & Farrokh Nourzad & David D. VanHoose, 2005.
"Openness, Centralized Wage Bargaining, and Inflation,"
Working Papers and Research
0505, Marquette University, Center for Global and Economic Studies and Department of Economics.
- Daniels, Joseph P. & Nourzad, Farrokh & VanHoose, David D., 2006. "Openness, centralized wage bargaining, and inflation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 969-988, December.
- Hein, Eckhard, 2001.
"Institutions and Macroeconomic Performance: Central Bank Independence, Labour Market Institutions and the Perspectives for Inflation and Employment in the European Monetary Union,"
18880, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hein, Eckhard, 2001. "Institutions and macroeconomic performance: Central bank independence, labour market institutions and the perspectives for inflation and employment in the European Monetary Union," WSI Discussion Papers 95, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
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