Central bank independence and inflation: good news and bad news
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 61 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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