This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2007-04-21 (All new papers)
• NEP-CBA-2007-04-21 (Central Banking)
• NEP-HIS-2007-04-21 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
• NEP-MAC-2007-04-21 (Macroeconomics)
• NEP-MON-2007-04-21 (Monetary Economics)

1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Forder, James, 1996. "On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 39-51, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Robert J. Barro, 1995. "Inflation and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5326, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. James Forder, 2005. "The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 431-444, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies : an international perspective," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Rerform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - an International Perspective," Papers 00-19, Tel Aviv.
   • Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey & Neyapti, Bilin, 2001. "Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Rerform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - an International Perspective," Papers 2000-19, Tel Aviv.
9. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
10. Andreas Freytag, 2005. "The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 391-409, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
12. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 06/228, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
13. Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Sandra Waller, 2005. "The European Central Bank: Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262042266.
14. Romer, David, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • David Romer, 1991. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • David Romer, 1991. "Openness and inflation: theory and evidence," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    Other versions:
    • Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
17. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2001. "Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2542, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 751-774, November. [Downloadable!]
    • Philip Keefer & David Stasavage, 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 56(4), pages 751-774, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. de Jong, Eelke, 2002. "Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 675-694, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)