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Assessing Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?

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  • Fry, Maxwell J
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    Abstract

    The author's fiscal dominance hypothesis of central bank independence posits that the size of the government's deficit and the methods by which it is financed determine central bank independence in developing countries. He measures central bank independence by the extent to which a central bank neutralizes the effects of increased credit demands by the government on the money supply by reducing credit to the private sector. The author's estimates show that larger deficits and greater government reliance on the domestic banking system are associated with less central bank neutralization of increased government borrowing from the banking system. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

    Volume (Year): 50 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 512-29

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:50:y:1998:i:3:p:512-29

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    Cited by:
    1. Jörg Bibow, 2001. "Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence," Macroeconomics 0108004, EconWPA.
    2. Ibrahim L. Awad, 2007. "Towards Measurement of Political Pressure on Central Banks in the Emerging Market Economies: The Case of the Central Bank of Egypt," Working Papers IES 2007/30, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Dec 2007.
    3. Gale, Douglas M & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Dollarization, Bailouts and the Stability of the Banking System," CEPR Discussion Papers 2901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Kai Hielscher & Gunther Markwardt, 2011. "The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence," CESifo Working Paper Series 3396, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Mark Mietzner & Dirk Schiereck, 2011. "Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 92-100, 02.
    6. Cristina Bodea, 2013. "Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 81-107, April.
    7. Peter Stella & Ulrich H. Klueh, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance: An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 08/176, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.

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