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Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends

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Author Info
Marco Arnone
Bernard J Laurens
Jean-François Segalotto
Martin Sommer

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Abstract

This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008

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Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan Journals in its journal IMF Staff Papers.

Volume (Year): 56 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 263-296
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Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:56:y:2009:i:2:p:263-296

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boschen, John F & Weise, Charles L, 2003. " What Starts Inflation: Evidence from the OECD Countries," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 323-49, June.
  2. Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Catao, Luis A.V. & Terrones, Marco E., 2005. "Fiscal deficits and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 529-554, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Atish R. Ghosh & Anne-Marie Gulde & Jonathan D. Ostry & Holger C. Wolf, 1997. "Does The Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?," Working Papers 97-09, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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  6. Irina Tytell & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004. "Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic Policies?," IMF Working Papers 04/84, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  9. Oatley, Thomas, 1999. " Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Corporatism, Partisanship, and Alternative Indices of Central Bank Independence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 399-413, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2002. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," NBER Working Papers 8963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  12. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1999. "International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes," NBER Working Papers 6965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  14. Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  15. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  16. Rodolfo Maino & Bernard Laurens, 2007. "China: Strengthening Monetary Policy Implementation," IMF Working Papers 07/14, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2007. "Political Monetary Cycles and a New de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 5898, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2008. "Quest for the best: How to measure central bank independence and show its relation with inflation?," Discussion Papers 37, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jonas Dovern & Ulrich Fritsche & Jiri Slacalek, 2009. "Disagreement among Forecasters in G7 Countries," Macroeconomics and Finance Series 200906, Hamburg University, Department Wirtschaft und Politik. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Alexandre Chailloux & Alain Durré & Bernard Laurens, 2009. "Requirements for Using Interest Rates as an Operating Target for Monetary Policy:The Case of Tunisia," IMF Working Papers 09/149, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Moser, Christoph / Dreher, Axel, 2007. "Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tuesta Vicente, 2007. "Independencia Legal y Efectiva del Banco Central de Reserva del Perú," Working Papers 2007-012, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bilin Neyapti, 2009. "Performance of Monetary Institutions : Comparative Evidence," Departmental Working Papers 0902, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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