Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Central Bank Independence and Output Variability

Contents:

Author Info

  • Crosby, M.

Abstract

The paper is structured as following in section a simple theoretical model is outlined, and it is found that an independent central bank should reduce (or eliminate) the inflation bias, but should increase output variability. in the following section empirical evidence consistent with the ida that countries which have smaller real shocks are more likely to choose an independent central bank is presented. The conclusion offers comments and suggestions fro further research.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by New South Wales - School of Economics in its series Papers with number 96/20.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nesowa:96/20

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, P.O.B. 1 KENSINGTON, NEW SOUTH WALES 2033 AUSTRALIA.
Phone: (+61)-2-9385-3380
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; INFLATION;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  2. Fischer, Stanley & Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Should Governments Learn to Live with Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 382-87, May.
  3. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  5. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Alternative monetary regimes : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 175-183, January.
  6. Crosby, Mark, 1998. "Central bank independence and output variability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 67-75, July.
  7. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
  8. Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-55, June.
  9. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Pagan, Adrian, 1984. "Econometric Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with Generated Regressors," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 221-47, February.
  11. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
  12. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Crosby, Mark, 1998. "Central bank independence and output variability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 67-75, July.
  2. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 72, Netherlands Central Bank.
  3. Demertzis, Maria, 2004. "Central Bank independence: Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 661-677, December.
  4. Perera, Anil & Ralston, Deborah & Wickramanayake, Jayasinghe, 2013. "Central bank financial strength and inflation: Is there a robust link?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 399-414.
  5. Tomislav Ćorić & Dajana Cvrlje, 2009. "Central bank independence: The case of Croatia," EFZG Working Papers Series 0909, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:nesowa:96/20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.