Zentralbankunabhängigkeit - Diskussion auf falschen Wegen
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik in its journal Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (WuG).
Volume (Year): 21 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Postal: Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abt. WW-Stat., Prinz Eugen Strasse 20-22, 1040 Wien Austria
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
- repec:nsr:niesrd:26 is not listed on IDEAS
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
- Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
- Michael Bruno & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1985. "Economics of Worldwide Stagflation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number brun85-1.
- Petit, Maria Luisa, 1989. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Co-ordination: A Differential Game Approac h," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(2), pages 161-79, April-Jun.
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