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Performance contracts for central bankers

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  • Christopher J. Waller

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its journal Review.

Volume (Year): (1995)
Issue (Month): Sep ()
Pages: 3-14

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:1995:i:sep:p:3-14

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Keywords: Banks and banking; Central;

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Cited by:
  1. Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 623-632, March.
  2. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
  3. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  4. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics 06, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 1997.
  5. Farvaque, Etienne & Lagadec, Gaël, 2001. "Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy," ZEI Working Papers B 01-2001, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  6. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," Working Papers, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics 115, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  7. Lossani Marco & Natale Piergiovanna & Tirelli Patrizio, 2001. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
  8. Thierry Warin, 2006. "A Note on Post-Modern Monetary Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0617, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  9. Thierry Warin, 2006. "From Full Employment to the Natural Rate of Unemployment: A Survey," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0601, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  10. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  11. Lamberte, Mario B., 2002. "Central Banking in the Philippines: Then, Now and the Future," Discussion Papers DP 2002-10, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
  12. Thierry Warin, 2005. "Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0508, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  13. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
  14. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics 21, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  15. Dai, Meixing & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2012. "Inflation contract, central bank transparency and model uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2371-2381.

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