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How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note

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  • Jerger, Jurgen
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-451WHHN-C/2/4afac5200a1bf71252b49b7125f91d2c
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 (March)
    Pages: 623-632

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:3:p:623-632

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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    1. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
    3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Christopher J. Waller, 1995. "Performance contracts for central bankers," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-14.
    5. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
    6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    7. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1996. "Future European monetary policy (Inaugural lecture on the occassion of the inauguration on the Stiftungsprofesssur Allgemeine Wirtschaftspolitik of the Stifterverband fur die Deutsche Wissenschaft at ," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-152890, Tilburg University.
    8. Laurence M. Ball, 1997. "Disinflation and the NAIRU," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 167-194 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Pusch, Toralf, 2007. "Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion," Working Papers on Economic Governance 23, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    2. Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008. "Central banks, trade unions and reputation - is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?," Working Papers on Economic Governance 31, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    3. Cavallari, Lilia, 2012. "Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 160-163.
    4. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
    5. Clemente De Lucia, 2003. "Wage Setters, Central Bank Conservatism and Economic Performance," ISAE Working Papers 34, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    6. Pusch, Toralf, 2008. "EZB contra Gewerkschaften? Mit Reputationsaufbau zur Vollbeschäftigung in Europa," Working Papers on Economic Governance 29, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    7. Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "Socially optimal monetary policy institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 761-781, November.

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