Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

EZB contra Gewerkschaften? Mit Reputationsaufbau zur Vollbeschäftigung in Europa

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pusch, Toralf

Abstract

Wenige Jahre nach der Etablierung der EWU zeigt sich ein gespaltenes Bild. Trotz unbestreitbarer Erfolge bei der Sicherung von Preisstabilität scheint die Beschäftigungs-Performance des Euroraums getrübt. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird die These vertreten, dass dies auch an einer mangelhaften Koordination Zentralbank und Gewerkschaften liegt. Hierzu wird ein spieltheoretisches Modell konstruiert, mit dem verschiedene makroökonomische Ergebnisse erklärt werden können. Mit einem Reputationsgleichgewicht wird ein Vorschlag dargestellt, der es Zentralbank und Gewerkschaften ermöglichen würde, Preisstabilität und einen hohen Beschäftigungsstand vereinbar zu machen. Wesentliche Voraussetzungen hierfür scheinen in Euroland aber nicht erfüllt zu sein. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/41343/1/637035887.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics in its series Working Papers on Economic Governance with number 29.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:uhhafs:29

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche/sozialoekonomie/startseite/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Labour unions; Reputation building; Employment; EMU;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 623-632, March.
  2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  3. Stefan Collignon, 2008. "The Lisbon strategy, macroeconomic stability and the dilemma of governance with governments; or why Europe is not becoming the world's most dynamic economy," International Journal of Public Policy, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(1/2), pages 72-99.
  4. Manfred Holler, 1991. "The Kreps-Wilson monopoly-entrant game and cautiously rationalizable sequential equilibria," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 69-83, February.
  5. Eckhard Hein & Achim Truger, 2006. "Monetary policy, macroeconomic policy mix and economic performance in the Euro area," IMK Working Paper 06-2006, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
  6. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  7. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  8. Carlin, Wendy & Soskice, David, 2005. "Macroeconomics: Imperfections, Institutions, and Policies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198776222, October.
  9. Soskice, David, 1990. "Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 36-61, Winter.
  10. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
  11. Cukierman Alex & Muscatelli Anton, 2008. "Nonlinear Taylor Rules and Asymmetric Preferences in Central Banking: Evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-31, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:uhhafs:29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.