Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining
AbstractThis paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 115 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Fiscal policy commitment; Optimal wage contract; Wage bargaining; Social pact; Inflation target;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E64 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francesco Lippi, 2003.
"Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 909-919.
- Francesco Lippi, 2003. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 909-919, October.
- Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non Atomistic Wage Setters," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1354, Econometric Society.
- Lippi, F., 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Papers 374, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
- Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 374, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Francesco Lippi, 2003. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters," CEIS Research Paper 17, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 56-63, January.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2009.
"The macroeconomics of social pacts,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-213, October.
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Tirelli Patrizio, 2007. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," wp.comunite 0028, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2004. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," Labor and Demography 0410003, EconWPA.
- Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 623-632, March.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,"
NBER Working Papers
0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
- Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 2002. "Revisiting the case for a populist central banker: A comment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 613-621, March.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.