Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.
Volume (Year): 37 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100261
Policy games; Monetary and fiscal policy interactions; Wage bargaining; Trade unions; Social pact; Corporatism; E52; E61; E63; J51;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 1997. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," Scholarly Articles 4553027, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-66, September.
- Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994.
"The Welfare State and Competitiveness,"
NBER Working Papers
4810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Holden, Steinar, 2005.
"Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 833-843, May.
- Steinar Holden, 2001. "Monetary Regimes and the Co-Ordination of Wage Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 429, CESifo Group Munich.
- Holden,S., 2000. "Monetary regime and the co-ordination of wage setting," Memorandum 01/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 56-63, January.
- Tito Boeri & Michael C. Burda, 2009.
"Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1440-1463, October.
- Tito Boeri & Michael C. Burda, 2008. "Preferences for Collective versus Individualised Wage Setting," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-021, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Boeri, Tito & Burda, Michael C., 2008. "Preferences for Collective versus Individualised Wage Setting," IZA Discussion Papers 3365, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Summers, Lawrence H & Gruber, Jonathan & Vergara, Rodrigo, 1993.
"Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 385-411, May.
- Lawrence H. Summers & Jonathan Gruber & Rodrigo Vergara, 1992. "Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism," NBER Working Papers 4063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005.
"Is corporatism feasible?,"
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995.
"Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers,"
DELTA Working Papers
95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
- Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Discussion Paper 1995-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2007. "Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 281-289, July.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 2002. "Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 333-389.
- Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003.
"Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
575, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
- Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-95, September.
- Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.