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The Cost Of Social Pacts

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  • Nicola Acocella
  • Giovanni Bartolomeo

Abstract

Social pacts, while improving macroeconomic performance, usually impose costs on unions. To facilitate the formation of such pacts, various substitutes can operate, such as the payment of transfers or, to some extent, the conservativeness of the government, union’s inflation aversion or political partisanship.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Bulletin of Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Pages: 238-255

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Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:238-255

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Cited by:
  1. Nicola Acocella, . "Teoria e pratica della politica economica: l’eredità del recente passato," Working Papers, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF 104/13, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.

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