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The Cost of Social Pacts

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  • Acocella, Nicola
  • Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni

Abstract

Social pacts, while improving macroeconomic performance, usually impose costs on unions. To facilitate the formation of such pacts, various substitutes can operate, such as the payment of transfers or, to some extent, the conservativeness of the government, union’s inflation aversion or political partisanship.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3585.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3585

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Keywords: Social pacts; side payments; conservativeness; partisanship; unions;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Acocella Nicola, 2013. "Teoria e pratica della politica economica: l'eredità del recente passato," Rivista di storia economica, Società editrice il Mulino, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 223-248.

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