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Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility

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  • Dal Bo, Ernesto

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 90 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4-5 (May)
Pages: 573-599

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:4-5:p:573-599

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  2. Taylor, John B, 1981. "Stabilization, Accommodation, and Monetary Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 145-49, May.
  3. Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto & Trebbi, Francesco, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," Scholarly Articles 4481498, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  5. Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Matthew O. JACKSON, 2003. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 596.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Thompson, Earl A, 1981. "Who Should Control the Money Supply?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 356-61, May.
  7. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
  8. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
  9. Knight, Brian G., 2000. "Supermajority voting requirements for tax increases: evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 41-67, April.
  10. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  11. Riboni, Alessandro, 2010. "Committees as Substitutes for Commitment," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7684, Paris Dauphine University.
  12. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco, 2006. "The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2006-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  13. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Scholarly Articles 4554123, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards And Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339, February.
  15. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1997. "Importing Credibility through Exchange Rate Pegging," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 687-94, May.
  16. Azariadis, Costas & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2002. "Fiscal Constitutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 255-281, April.
  17. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2004. "Voting on Majority Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 115-132.
  18. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, 1989. "Lectures on Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022834, December.
  19. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
  20. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  21. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2001. "The advantage of transparent instruments of monetary policy," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 614, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  22. Waller, Christopher J, 1992. "The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-12, September.
  23. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
  24. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  25. Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "Optimal taxation and fiscal constitution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 471-485, June.
  26. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  27. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  28. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco, 2006. "The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 02-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2008. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 02-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 524-540.
  4. Marcela Eslava, 2007. "Central Bankers In Government Appointed Committees," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 002051, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  5. Tiberiu Dragu & Mattias Polborn, 2009. "Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability," CESifo Working Paper Series 2864, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Riboni, Alessandro, 2010. "Committees as Substitutes for Commitment," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7684, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Paul Schure & Francesco Passerelli & David Scoones, 2007. "When the Powerful Drag Their Feet," Department Discussion Papers 0703, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.

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