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Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion

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  • Pusch, Toralf

Abstract

Zur makroökonomischen Interaktion von Zentralbank und Gewerkschaften hat es in den letzten Jahren vermehrt spieltheoretische Beiträge gegeben. Der Vorzug der spieltheoretischen Methode ist dabei, dass sie den Blick auf die Handlungslogiken der makroökonomischen Akteure erweitert. Zielkonflikte zwischen den Akteuren können somit deutlich herausgearbeitet werden. Mögliche Konsequenz kann beispielsweise eine deutliche Verfehlung der von den Akteuren als optimal erachteten Niveaus von Preisstabilität und Beschäftigung sein. Dass dies nicht so sein muss, wird im vorliegenden Beitrag am Beispiel einer alternativen Modellierung der gewerkschaftlichen Lohnpolitik gezeigt. Damit sind aber noch nicht die Voraussetzungen für eine Beschäftigungsexpansion bei stabilen Preisen erfüllt. Im keynesianischen Fall einer geldpolitischen Führung wäre vielmehr die Zentralbank gefragt, einen geldpolitischen Vertrauensvorschuss zu erbringen. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics in its series Working Papers on Economic Governance with number 23.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:uhhafs:23

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Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche/sozialoekonomie/startseite/
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Keywords: Monetary Policy; wage policy; Stackelberg-leadership;

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  1. Otmar Issing, 2002. "Anmerkungen zur Koordinierung der makroökonomischen Politik in der WWU," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(3), pages 312-324.
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