Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?
AbstractA 1990s view is that inflation is best avoided by delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank. However most analyses overlook fiscal policy, which cannot be delegated. Here we make a very simple extension of the usual policy game by introducing the government as a third player, in charge of a fiscal instrument for demand management. If the government delegates monetary policy, there will be a battle over aggregate demand. Although the bank wins, so that inflation is avoided, it is as the cost of an excessive interest rate. Society's welfare may be lower than with no delegation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 443.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Central Bank Independence ; Monetary-fiscal coordination ; demand Management;
Other versions of this item:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
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