Dissecting the Two-Handed Approach: Who’s the Expert Hand For What?
AbstractIn this paper, we address the question of the macroeconomic assignment problem of wage and demand policy that is implicit in the “two-handed approach”. As a novelty relative to the existing literature, we thereby distinguish the two levels of policy instruments and policy makers. Unfortunately, but also illuminatingly for the policy debate, these two perspectives may well lead to opposing policy recommendations. Whereas demand policy is likely to be the instrument better suited to target output – and hence wage policy to target inflation – it is equally plausible that demand and wage policy makers should not be entrusted with these targets.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Duncker & Humblot, Berlin in its journal Applied Economics Quarterly.
Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.duncker-humblot.de
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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- Pusch, Toralf, 2007.
"Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion
[The struggle over distribution and monetary sanction]," MPRA Paper 15228, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008.
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Working Papers on Economic Governance
31, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
- Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008. "Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?," MPRA Paper 19719, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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