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Dissecting the Two-Handed Approach: Who’s the Expert Hand For What?

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  • Jürgen Jerger
  • Oliver Landmann
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    Abstract

    In this paper, we address the question of the macroeconomic assignment problem of wage and demand policy that is implicit in the “two-handed approach”. As a novelty relative to the existing literature, we thereby distinguish the two levels of policy instruments and policy makers. Unfortunately, but also illuminatingly for the policy debate, these two perspectives may well lead to opposing policy recommendations. Whereas demand policy is likely to be the instrument better suited to target output – and hence wage policy to target inflation – it is equally plausible that demand and wage policy makers should not be entrusted with these targets.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Duncker & Humblot, Berlin in its journal Applied Economics Quarterly.

    Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 50-70

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    Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqaeq:v52_y2006_i3_q3_p50-70

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    Web page: http://www.duncker-humblot.de

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    Web: http://www.duncker-humblot.de/index.php/zeitschriften/wirtschafts-undsozialwissenschaften/appliedeconomicsquarterly.html

    Related research

    Keywords: Wage Policy; Demand Policy; Assignment Problem; Two-Handed Approach;

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    Cited by:
    1. Pusch, Toralf, 2007. "Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion," Working Papers on Economic Governance 23, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    2. Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008. "Central banks, trade unions and reputation - is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?," Working Papers on Economic Governance 31, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.

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