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Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development

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Author Info
Alex Cukierman

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Abstract

Monetary policy usually enables policymakers to quickly but temporarily, achieve various real goals like high employment, financing of the budget deficit, attainment of balance of payments objectives and low interest rates. In the process, high powered money is increased fueling inflation. To offset this policy bias, various institutional mechanisms that reduce the ability of governments to freely expand the money supply have been tried. Among them, an important device, which is gaining popularity recently, is the granting of sufficient independence to the Central Bank in conjunction with an unequivocal mandate to focus on the attainment of price stability. This paper surveys several alternative ways lo characterize independence and also can be considered as validating the more general proposition that the design of policymaking institution matters.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía.

Volume (Year): 30 (1993)
Issue (Month): 91 ()
Pages: 271-292
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Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:30:y:1993:i:91:p:271-292

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39, pages 95-140, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alesina, Alberto F & Cohen, Gerald D & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stanley Fischer, 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," NBER Working Papers 3702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  7. Fischer, S., 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," Working papers 580, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sfia, Mohamed Daly, 2007. "Régimes de change: Le chemin vers la flexibilité," MPRA Paper 4085, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cukierman, A., 1996. "The economics of central banking," Discussion Paper 31, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Luis Felipe Céspedes C. & Rodrigo Valdés P., 2006. "Central Bank Autonomy: The Chilean Experience," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 9(1), pages 25-47, April. [Downloadable!]
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