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Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique
[Central bank independence and effectiveness of economic policy]

Author

Listed:
  • Ndjana, Willy Freddie
  • Alia, Didier Yélognissè
  • Mendo, Paulin

Abstract

This paper examines the different interactions that can exist between an independent central bank and the economic policy in a country. The focal point of this survey is based on the « temporal incoherence »problem raised in the years 1970 by Prescott and Kydland. These two authors arrived to the conclusion that, the separation between public authorities and monetary authorities would guarantee an economic stability. The rush observed since some years of the central banks toward the independence vis-`a-vis of public authorities contributed to carry a decisive stroke to the economic policy’s efficiency thus.

Suggested Citation

  • Ndjana, Willy Freddie & Alia, Didier Yélognissè & Mendo, Paulin, 2009. "Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique [Central bank independence and effectiveness of economic policy]," MPRA Paper 31372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31372
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31372/1/MPRA_paper_31372.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
    3. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    4. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1993. "Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 30(91), pages 271-292.
    6. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 1994. "Indépendance de la banque centrale et politique budgétaire," Working Papers 1994-02, CEPII research center.
    7. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank; independance; temporal incoherence; economic policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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