Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique
[Central bank independence and effectiveness of economic policy]
AbstractThis paper examines the different interactions that can exist between an independent central bank and the economic policy in a country. The focal point of this survey is based on the « temporal incoherence »problem raised in the years 1970 by Prescott and Kydland. These two authors arrived to the conclusion that, the separation between public authorities and monetary authorities would guarantee an economic stability. The rush observed since some years of the central banks toward the independence vis-`a-vis of public authorities contributed to carry a decisive stroke to the economic policy’s efficiency thus.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31372.
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Central bank; independance; temporal incoherence; economic policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
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- Alex Cukierman, 1993. "Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 30(91), pages 271-292.
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