AbstractWe study cross-country insurance in a currency union with nominal price and wage rigidities. We provide two results that build the case for the creation of a fiscal union within a currency union. First, we show that, if financial markets are incomplete, the value of gaining access to any given level of insurance is greater for countries that are members of a currency union. Second, we show that, even if financial markets are complete, private insurance is inefficiently low. A role emerges for government intervention in macro insurance to both guarantee its existence and to influence its operation. The efficient insurance arrangement can be implemented by contingent transfers within a fiscal union. The benefits of such a fiscal union are larger, the bigger the asymmetric shocks affecting the members of the currency union, the more persistent these shocks, and the less open the member economies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18280.
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2012-08-23 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-OPM-2012-08-23 (Open Economy Macroeconomic)
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- Jonathan Hoddenbagh & Mikhail Dmitriev, 2013.
"The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union,"
pho497, Job Market Papers.
- Luigi Guiso & Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli, 2013. "A Cultural Clash View of the EU Crisis," EIEF Working Papers Series 1321, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Jul 2013.
- Guiso, Luigi & Herrera, Helios & Morelli, Massimo, 2013. "A Culture Based Theory of Fiscal Union Desirability," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 137, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
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