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The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey

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  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (University of Paris 13, CEPN)

Abstract

This critical survey demonstrates for the first time that the underlying tenets of the resource curse/blessing are borrowed directly from “staple theory”. It also focuses uniquely on appropriability with two key issues in mind: (1) state appropriability of assets, and (2) the mobility of assets to thwart appropriation. In the previous resource curse literature, mobility has been framed using the concept of lootability. Appropriability is related to non-lootable assets, such as oil, that can be seized by the state or rival private oligarchs. Recent resource curse research has addressed appropriability by distinguishing between point-source resources and diffuse-source resources. This survey demonstrates that this distinction is borrowed from staple theory, and that point-source and diffuse-source resources are defined in terms of geographical concentration/dispersion rather than institutional characteristics. By establishing that political institutions, markets and incentives are the most important elements for determining appropriability, the resource curse/blessing literature could support a general positive theory of the predatory state.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0533-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0533-5
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    8. Zuo, Na & Zhong, Hua, 2019. "The Effect of Resource Wealth on Regional Economic Development in China," 2019 Annual Meeting, July 21-23, Atlanta, Georgia 291114, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    9. Yilanci, Veli & Aslan, Murat & Ozgur, Onder, 2021. "Disaggregated analysis of the curse of natural resources in most natural resource-abundant countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Captive and fugitive assets; Lootable goods; Natural resource curse; Point-source and diffuse-source resources; Predatory state; Staple theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture

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