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Oil and the duration of dictatorships

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  • Jesus Crespo Cuaresma

    ()

  • Harald Oberhofer

    ()

  • Paul Raschky

    ()

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model that analyses the relationship between a country?s oil endowment and the duration of its autocratic leader. The dictator uses the rents from oil extraction for both personal gain and to pay-off potential opposition and chooses an optimal level of oil exploitation. A group of kingmakers, on the other side, decides whether to stage a coup d??tat and establish a new dictator. The relationship between oil endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is modulated by the price of oil. Applying an empirical survival model on data for the duration of 106 dictatorships supports the predictions of the theoretical model.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2008-24.

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Length: 24
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Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2008-24

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Keywords: Natural resources; dictatorship; political economy; duration.;

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Olja kan gynna diktatorer
    by nonicoclolasos in Nonicoclolasos on 2010-02-17 11:28:45
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Cited by:
  1. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Doris A. Oberdabernig, 2014. "Education and the Transition to Sustained Democracy," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp170, Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics.
  2. Perez Nino, Helena & Le Billon, Philippe, 2013. "Foreign aid, resource rents and institution-building in Mozambique and Angola," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  3. Vincenzo Bove & Roberto Nisticò, 2014. "Coups d'état and Defense Spending: A Counterfactual Analysis," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 366, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  4. Elisabeth Nindl, 2014. "An empirical assessment of Fairtrade: A perspective for low- and middle-income countries?," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp160, Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics.
  5. Randall Holcombe & Christopher Boudreaux, 2013. "Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 409-421, September.
  6. John Anyanwu & Andrew E. O. Erhijakpor, 2013. "Working Paper 184 - Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa?," Working Paper Series, African Development Bank 988, African Development Bank.
  7. Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2013. "Oil and political survival," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 89-106.
  8. Furlan, Benjamin & Gächter, Martin & Krebs, Bob & Oberhofer, Harald, 2012. "Democratization and real exchange rates," Working Papers in Economics and Finance, University of Salzburg 2012-6, University of Salzburg, revised 28 Oct 2013.
  9. Martin Gassebner & Michael J. Lamla & James Raymond Vreeland, 2013. "Extreme Bounds of Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(2), pages 171-197, April.
  10. Egil Matsen & Gisle J. Natvik & Ragnar Torvik, 2012. "Petro populism," Working Paper, Norges Bank 2012/06, Norges Bank.
  11. Möller, Marie, 2012. "An empirical study of the limits and perspectives of institutional transfers," CIW Discussion Papers 02/2012, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).

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