Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The resource curse revisited: Governance and natural resources

Contents:

Author Info

  • Busse, Matthias
  • Gröning, Steffen

Abstract

The paper analyses the impact of natural resource abundance on selected governance indicators. In contrast to earlier studies that are mainly confined to cross-sectional analysis, we use a panel data set with a large number of countries and an extended period of time. Moreover, we employ an instrumental variable technique to account for endogeneity. The results show that exports of natural resources have, above all, led to an increase in corruption. This result is robust to both different model specifications and an alternative indicator for natural resource abundance. For other governance indicators, such as law and order and bureaucratic quality, we either find no results or results that lack robustness. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48184/1/663755492.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) in its series HWWI Research Papers with number 106.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:106

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Heimhuder Str. 71, D-20148 Hamburg
Phone: +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 0
Fax: +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 776
Email:
Web page: http://www.hwwi.org/en/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Natural Resources; Resource Curse; Corruption; Governance;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
  2. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
  3. Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Erwin H. Bulte, 2006. "The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 06/61, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  4. Freille, Sebastian & Haque, M. Emranul & Kneller, Richard, 2007. "A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 838-862, December.
  5. Arvind Subramanian & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria," IMF Working Papers 03/139, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Sambit Bhattacharyya & Roland Hodler, 2008. "Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption," OxCarre Working Papers 020, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
  7. Fernanda Brollo & Tommaso Nannicini & Roberto Perotti & Guido Tabellini, 2009. "The Political Resource Curse," Working Papers 356, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  8. Rodrik, Dani & Subramanian, Arvind & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Robert J. Barro, 1999. "Determinants of Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S158-S183, December.
  10. Jonathan Isham & Michael Woolcock & Lant Pritchett & Gwen Busby, 2005. "The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 141-174.
  11. Auty, Richard M., 2001. "The political economy of resource-driven growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 839-846, May.
  12. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  13. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
  14. Bulte, Erwin H. & Damania, Richard & Deacon, Robert T., 2005. "Resource intensity, institutions, and development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1029-1044, July.
  15. Christa N. Brunnschweiler, 2006. "Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic growth," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 06/51, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  16. Michael Alexeev & Robert Conrad, 2009. "The Elusive Curse of Oil," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 586-598, August.
  17. Richard Blundell & Steve Bond, 1995. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," IFS Working Papers W95/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  18. Pedro C. Vicente, 2007. "Does Oil Corrupt? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in West Africa," Economics Series Working Papers 317, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  19. repec:sae:joupea:v:47:y:2010:i:4:p:421-431 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
  21. Danila Serra, 2006. "Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 225-256, January.
  22. Kevin K. Tsui, 2011. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 89-115, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Hillmann, Katja & Hohenleitner, Ingrid, 2012. "Impact of benefit sanctions on unemployment outflow: Evidence from German survey data," HWWI Research Papers 129, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:106

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.