The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability
AbstractThis paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which natural resources can affect democracy. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The theory is corroborated using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents. Results are robust to a range of alternative specifications. A supplementary analysis reveals that, consistent with the two-period model proposed, the effects are more acute closer to national elections. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 154 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Democracy; Political economy; Natural resources; Curses; Africa; D73; O13; O55;
Other versions of this item:
- Eoin F. McGuirk & Eoin F. McGuirk, 2010. "The Illusory Leader: Natural Resources, Taxation and Accountability," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp327, IIIS.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O55 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
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