Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Illusory Leader: Natural Resources, Taxation and Accountability

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eoin F. McGuirk

    ()
    (Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity College Dublin)

  • Eoin F. McGuirk

Abstract

This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which the natural resource curse can operate. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The theory is tested using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents, taxation and election proximity. It is found that an increase in natural resource rents decreases perceived tax enforcement, which in turn reduces the demand for regular, open and honest elections. Results are robust to alternative specifications. A supplementary analysis reveals that, consistent with the two-period model proposed, the effects are more acute closer to national elections. The findings support political-economy explanations of how natural resources affect economies, in which resource rents are purported to influence the decisions of the political elite through increased returns to staying in power.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp327.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IIIS in its series The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series with number iiisdp327.

as in new window
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp327

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 01
Phone: 00 353 1 896 3888
Fax: 00 353 1 896 3939
Web page: http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Democracy; Political Economy; Natural Resources; Curses; Africa;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Vicente, Pedro C., 2010. "Does oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 28-38, May.
  2. Morrison, Kevin M., 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(01), pages 107-138, January.
  3. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2013. "Taxation and democratization," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 164, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  2. Alexander James, 2013. "US State Fiscal Policy and Natural Resources," Economics Series Working Papers OxCarre Research Paper 12, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Pedro L. Rodríguez, José R. Morales, Fancisco J. Monaldi, 2012. "Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?," Working Papers 306, Center for Global Development.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eva Mateo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.