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Contesting Resources - Rent Seeking, Conflict and the Natural Resource Curse

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  • Bulte, Erwin
  • Wick, Katharina

Abstract

A growing empirical literature links natural resource abundance and "pointiness" to impeded economic growth and civil strife. We develop rent seeking and conflict models that capture the most salient features of contests for resource rents, and show how both resource abundance and geographical clustering can be associated with intense contests and sub-optimal economic performance. However, we also show that these relationships are not necessarily monotonous { pointiness can trigger more intense contests but can also facilitate the coordination on peaceful outcomes. Finally we show that contesting resources through violent conflict may yield superior outcomes (from an economy-wide perspective) than contests through rent seeking. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics in its series Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 with number 36.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3509

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Keywords: point resources; civil war; economic growth and resources;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Christian Lessmann & Gunther Markwardt, 2013. "Natural-Resource Rents and Internal Conflicts - Can Decentralization Lift the Curse?," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 4180, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Rabah Arezki & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2008. "Can The Natural Resource Curse Be Turned Into A Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions," OxCarre Working Papers, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford 001, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
  3. Petros G. Sekeris, 2012. "The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World," Working Papers, University of Namur, Department of Economics 1213, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  4. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2006. "Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Collier, Paul & Goderis, Benedikt, 2008. "Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum," MPRA Paper 17315, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Al-Ubaydli, Omar, 2012. "Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 137-152.
  7. Wick, A.K., 2008. "Conflicts, Development and Natural Resources: An Applied Game Theoretic Approach," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3160797, Tilburg University.
  8. Frederick Van der Ploeg, 2010. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3125, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Rabah Arezki & Frederik van der Ploeg, 2007. "Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned Into a Blessing? T+L3479he Role of Trade Policies and Institutions," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 07/55, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Azarhoushang, Behzad & Rukavina, Marko, 2014. "Resource curse: A comparative study," IPE Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE) 30/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
  11. Janus, Thorsten, 2012. "Natural resource extraction and civil conflict," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 24-31.
  12. Oskenbayev, Yessengali & Karimov, Aziz, 2013. "Is Kazakhstan vulnerable to natural resource curse?," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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