IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jafrec/v15y2006i1p26-58.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Paul Azam

Abstract

A typical pattern of wealth redistribution seems to prevail, in some African countries, between rich and poor ethno-regional groups. A contract-theoretic model is presented for shedding some light on this phenomenon. The government promises a transfer to its potential opponent in return for not engaging in a civil war. The latter may break out because of the imperfect credibility of the government's commitment. This increases the cost of the required transfer of wealth, and may make it unfeasible. The model determines whether a military regime or a redistributive state prevails in a peaceful equilibrium. This depends on two parameters: (i) the relative fighting efficiency and (ii) the relative productivity of the two groups. The social cost of the different regimes is then compared, and their implications for aid policy are discussed. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Azam, 2006. "The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 15(1), pages 26-58, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:26-58
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 38(4), pages 429-444, July.
    2. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
    3. Hugh Neary, 1997. "A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 373-388, December.
    4. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    5. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-712, June.
    6. Deger, Saadet & Sen, Somnath, 1995. "Military expenditure and developing countries," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 275-307, Elsevier.
    7. repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jean-Claude Berthélemy & Jean-Paul Azam & Stéphane Calipel & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Risque politique et croissance en Afrique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 819-829.
    9. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
    10. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    11. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-388, December.
    12. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August.
    13. Tony Addison & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 487-501, July.
    14. Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993. "Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1003-1010, September.
    15. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    16. Ola Olsson & Heather Congdon Fors, 2004. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
    17. Noh, Suk Jae, 1999. "A General Equilibrium Model of Two Group Conflict with Endogenous Intra-group Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 251-267, March.
    18. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
    19. Murshed, S Mansoob & Sen, Somnath, 1995. "Aid Conditionality and Military Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries: Models of Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(429), pages 498-509, March.
    20. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. "Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-475, June.
    21. Robert H. Bates, 2005. "Political Reform," CID Working Papers 114, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    22. Robert H. Bates, 2000. "Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 131-134, May.
    23. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    24. Azam, Jean-Paul, 1995. "How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 173-184, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Persson, Torsten & Besley, Tim, 2008. "The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7101, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12069 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Silve, Arthur & Verdier, Thierry, 2018. "A theory of regional conflict complexes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 434-447.
    4. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2009. "Betting on Displacement: Oil, Violence, and the Switch to Civilian Rule in Nigeria," TSE Working Papers 09-034, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Pierre Andre & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2010. "Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," Working Papers halshs-00962698, HAL.
    6. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2010. "A State is Born: Transport Infrastructure and Democracy in Somaliland," IDEI Working Papers 668, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    7. Azam Jean-Paul, 2014. "The Birth of a Democracy: Homegrown Bicameralism in Somaliland," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-22, April.
    8. Frédéric Gaspart & Pierre Pecher, 2019. "Ethnic Inclusiveness of the Central State Government and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 28(2), pages 176-201.
    9. Larissa Nawo & Désiré Avom & Kyle McNabb & Luc Nembot, 2019. "Unofficial sovereign wealth funds and duration in power in Africa," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-57, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. André, Pierre & Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine, 2011. "The Allocation of Public Goods and National Elections in Ghana," MPRA Paper 29873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "Repression or Civil War?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 292-297, May.
    12. Avidit Acharya & Robin Harding & J. Andrew Harris, 2020. "Security in the absence of a state: Traditional authority, livestock trading, and maritime piracy in northern Somalia," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 497-537, October.
    13. Pierre André & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2013. "Sitting on the fence: Pork-barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," THEMA Working Papers 2013-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    14. Schroyen, Fred & Treich, Nicolas, 2016. "The power of money: Wealth effects in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 46-68.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5746 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Azam, Jean-Paul & Thelen, Véronique, 2014. "Did the Aid Boom Pacify Sub-Saharan Africa?: Ex-Post Evaluation Using a Near-Identification Approach," TSE Working Papers 14-544, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2019.
    17. Ivan Lopez Cruz & Gustavo Torrens, 2019. "The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 421-460, September.
    18. Ishihara Akifumi & Singh Prakarsh, 2016. "Concessions and Repression in Conflict," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 865-899, April.
    19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12022 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean-Paul Azam, 2002. "Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 131-153, February.
    2. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2003. "Beyond the Good and the Evil: Anarchy, Commitment, and Peace," IDEI Working Papers 195, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    3. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. "Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-475, June.
    4. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2006. "Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 457-476, September.
    5. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    6. Tony Addison & Mansoob Murshed, 2001. "From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-48, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Conflict diamonds," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 267-286, March.
    8. Joan-Maria Esteban & József Sákovics, 2005. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict," Working Papers 255, Barcelona School of Economics.
    9. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2008. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 227-252, November.
    10. Tangerås, Thomas P. & Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2002. "Ethnic Diversity and Civil War," Working Paper Series 589, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    11. Mansoob Murshed, 2008. "On the Non-Contractual Nature of Donor-Recipient Interaction in Development Assistance," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2008-71, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. Scott Gates, 2002. "Recruitment and Allegiance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 111-130, February.
    13. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    14. Almuth Scholl, 2018. "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 626-648, July.
    15. Cordella, Tito & Missale, Alessandro, 2013. "To give or to forgive? Aid versus debt relief," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 504-528.
    16. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, July.
    17. Almuth Scholl, 2009. "Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(2), pages 377-391, April.
    18. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    19. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2004. "A model of the origins of basic property rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 288-312, November.
    20. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Ola Olsson, 0. "Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 17(suppl_1), pages -109.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:26-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csaoxuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.