Olsson, Ola () (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University) Congdon, Heather (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)
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The article analyzes the war against Mobutu (1996-97) and the more recent war (1998-) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with particular attention to greed and grievance as motivating factors in these two wars. Whereas our usage of the term ‘greed’ simply reflects the desire to gain control of natural resource rents, we model ‘grievance’ as deliberate institutional differences, implemented by the ruler, between the formal and informal sectors. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative evidence, we outline a model of a predatory conflict between a kleptocratic ruler and a group of potential predators within a given region. The potential predators choose between peaceful production and predation on the ruling elite, who control the country’s natural resource rents. It is shown that institutional grievance between the formal and informal sectors, along with the relative strength of the ruler's defense, play a key role for the initiation of a war. This observation is used to explain the timing of the two wars analyzed in this article. The model also shows that once a war has commenced, the abundance of natural resources and the ruler’s kleptocratic tendencies determine conflict intensity. This result is also well in line with experience from the most recent Congolese war.
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Paper provided by Göteborg University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number
97.
Length: 37 pages Date of creation: 16 May 2003 Date of revision:
30 Oct 2003 Publication status: Published in Journal of Peace Research, 2004, pages 321-336. Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0097
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden Phone: 031-773 10 00 Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games N47 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - Africa; Oceania P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Skaperdas, S., 2000.
"Warlord Competition,"
Papers
00-01-20, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Other versions:
Skaperdas, Stergios, 2001.
"Warlord Competition,"
Working Papers
UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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