AbstractWarlords complete for turf that provides them with rents and "taxable" resources while also providing a semblance of security within their respective territories. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition can lead to lower welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. Rents crowd out production, in some cases almost cmpletely so.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number UNU-WIDER Research Paper DP2001/54.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
warlord competition; conflict; cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour;
Other versions of this item:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
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