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Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kai A. Konrad ()
Wolfgang Leininger ()
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We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
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Paper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number
0016.
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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007Date of revision:
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Keywords: Free-riding ; defence ; collective action ; distributional conflict ; war ; norms ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2008.
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