Plunder & Protections Inc
AbstractWhen the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualiÞed violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this .market for extortion. the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the proÞtability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 10/2002.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
entrepreneurs; plundering; extortion; violence;
Other versions of this item:
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Plunder & Protection Inc," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 447-459, July.
- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
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