AbstractWarlords complete for turf that provides them with rents and "taxable" resources while also providing a semblance of security within their respective territories. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition can lead to lower welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. Rents crowd out production, in some cases almost cmpletely so.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 00-01-20.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
TAXATION ; COMPETITION ; RENT ; PRODUCTION;
Other versions of this item:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
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