Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime

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Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime

Author Info

Russell S. Sobel () (Department of Economics, P.O. Box 6025, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA)
Brian J. Osoba () (Department of Economics, 208 RVAC, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, CT 06050, USA;)

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Abstract

We hypothesize that the failure of government to protect the rights of individuals from violence committed by youths has led to the formation of youth gangs as protective agencies. Our theory predicts an opposite direction of causality between gang activity and violent crime from what is widely accepted. While areas with more gang activity also have more violence, our results suggest that gangs form as protection agencies precisely in areas with high violent crime rates. While gangs, like governments, use violence to enforce rules, the net impact of gangs is likely to lower violent crime. We test this hypothesis and offer policy implications.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 996-1018
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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:75:4:y:2009:p:996-1018

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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