Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development
Abstract
This paper investigates how people subdivided in social groups behave in an economy without property rights. Facing a linear production technology groups follow Markovian strategies for consumption and investment. Additionally, they may spend effort in an appropriation contest. For a symmetric society I show that conflict prevents investment and growth. In a society at peace economic growth may occur. Growth, however, is decreasing in the degree of social fractionalization and smaller than it could be under secure property rights. In an economy populated by social groups of unequal size an asymmetric equilibrium exists. A large majority may behave peacefully although continuously challenged by a predatory minority. In that case the economy either stagnates or grows at a low rate. Growth is decreasing in the size of the predatory minority and its conflict intensity.Download Info
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Paper provided by DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade in its series DEGIT Conference Papers with number c009_018.Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:deg:conpap:c009_018
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Related research
Keywords: Africa’s Growth Tragedy; Property Rights; Social Conflict; Fractionalization;Other versions of this item:
- Holger Strulik, 2008. "Social composition, social conflict and economic development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 1145-1170, 07.
- Holger Strulik, 2005. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," Discussion Papers 05-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Strulik, Holger, 2006. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover dp-350, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Smith, John, 2009.
"Reputation, social identity and social conflict,"
MPRA Paper
18082, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John Smith, 2012. "Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 677-709, 08.
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