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Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development

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  • Strulik, Holger

Abstract

This article shows within a simple growth model how the make up of society affects economic performance when property rights are unenforceable. It investigates behavior of non-cooperative social groups that consume, produce, and appropriate resources either peacefully or through contest. For the case of symmetric groups it is shown that economic growth is generated only in peaceful societies. For the case of asymmetric groups rebel-equilibria are investigated in which a large majority behaves peacefully although challenged by an aggressive minority. In each case it is shown how the possibility of conflict and its intensity and the rate of economic growth depend on social fractionalizaton, general productivity of the economy, and the ease at which resources are appropriated. A final part extends the analysis towards behavior of non-benevolent social elites.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) with number dp-350.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-350

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Keywords: Social Conflict; Social Fractionalization; Property Rights; Stagnation; Growth;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. John Smith, 2007. "Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict," Departmental Working Papers 200709, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. Strulik, Holger, 2011. "Poverty, Voracity, and Growth," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-473, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  3. Rohner, Dominic, 2011. "Reputation, group structure and social tensions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 188-199, November.
  4. Stela Cani, 2009. "Resource Abundance, Mineral Funds and Institutional Quality," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2009-04, Henley Business School, Reading University.

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