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Reputation, group structure and social tensions

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  • Rohner, Dominic

Abstract

Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision, and can be a driving force for more serious conflicts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, the emergence of social tensions has been studied only rarely in the literature. In the present contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective effects of ethnic fractionalization, polarization and segregation are analyzed. The differences between ethnicity and class, and the role of social mobility are also studied. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 96 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 188-199

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:96:y:2011:i:2:p:188-199

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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Keywords: Conflict Group cleavages Reputation Ethnicity Social capital;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rohner, Dominic & Thoenig, Mathias & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2012. "Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda," CEPR Discussion Papers 8741, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. John Smith, 2012. "Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 677-709, 08.
  3. Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibottix, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," HiCN Working Papers 95, Households in Conflict Network.
  4. Hannes Mueller & Dominic Rohner & David Schoenholzer, 2013. "Tectonic Boundaries and Strongholds: The Religious Geography of Violence in Northern Ireland," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 13.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  5. Frederick Van der Ploeg & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "War and Natural Resource Exploitation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3244, CESifo Group Munich.

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