Reputation, social identity, and social conflict
AbstractWe interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both unbiased and biased players. Biased players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. For unbiased players, group membership has no payoff relevant consequences. We show that the unbiased players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23336.
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2010
Date of revision:
social identity theory; social fragmentation;
Other versions of this item:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2010-06-26 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2010-06-26 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-06-26 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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