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Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets

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Author Info
Roland Bénabou () (Princeton University, NBER, CEPR and IZA)
Jean Tirole () (Université de Toulouse and MIT)

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Abstract

We analyze social and economic phenomena involving beliefs which people value and invest in, for affective or functional reasons. Individuals are at times uncertain about their own "deep values" and infer them from their past choices, which then come to define "who they are". Identity investments increase when information is scarce or when a greater endowment of some asset (wealth, career, family, culture) raises the stakes on viewing it as valuable (escalating commitments). Taboos against transactions or the mere contemplation of tradeoffs arise to protect fragile beliefs about the "priceless" value of certain assets (life, freedom, love, faith) or things one "would never do". Whether such behaviors are welfareenhancing or reducing depends on whether beliefs are sought for a functional value (sense of direction, self-discipline) or for "mental consumption" motives (self-esteem, anticipatory feelings). Escalating commitments can thus lead to a "hedonic treadmill", and competing identities cause dysfunctional failures to invest in high-return activities (education, adapting to globalization, assimilation), or even the destruction of productive assets. In social interactions, norm violations elicit a forceful response (exclusion, harassment) when they threaten a strongly held identity, but further erode morale when it was initially weak. Concerns for pride, dignity or wishful thinking lead to the inefficient breakdown of Coasian bargaining even under symmetric information, as partners seek to self-enhance and shift blame by turning down "insultingly low" offers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2583.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2583

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Related research
Keywords: identity; self-serving beliefs; self-image; memory; wishful thinking; anticipatory utility; self control; hedonic treadmill; bargaining; taboos; religion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

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  1. Fershtman, Chaim & Gneezy, Uri & Hoffman, Moshe, 2008. "Taboos: Considering the Unthinkable," CEPR Discussion Papers 6854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Daniel J. Benjamin & James J. Choi & A. Joshua Strickland, 2007. "Social Identity and Preferences," NBER Working Papers 13309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Philippe Jehiel & David Ettinger, 2007. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000126, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Adriani, Fabrizio & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2009. "Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? An information-based theory," MPRA Paper 16107, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. H. Peyton Young, 2008. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception," Economics Series Working Papers 383, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tabellini, Guido, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6534, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Amelie Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann, 2007. "Measuring Ethnic Identity and Its Impact on Economic Behavior," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 721, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alaoui, Larbi, 2009. "The value of useless information," MPRA Paper 11411, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. McLeish, Kendra N. & Oxoby, Robert J., 2008. "Social Interactions and the Salience of Social Identity," IZA Discussion Papers 3554, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. Itzhak Gilboa & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & David Schmeidler, 2008. "Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 73, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2008. [Downloadable!]
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