Reputation, social identity and social conflict
AbstractWe interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both unbiased and biased players. Biased players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. For unbiased players, group membership has no payoff relevant consequences. We show that the unbiased players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 18082.
Date of creation: 22 Oct 2009
Date of revision:
reputation; identity; conflict;
Other versions of this item:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benjamin Bridgman, .
"Why Are Ethnically Divided Countries Poor?,"
Departmental Working Papers
2003-11, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Hillel Rapoport & Avi Weiss, 2001.
"The Optimal Size for a Minority,"
2001-01, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
- Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2006.
"The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence using random assignment to real social groups,"
06-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2006. "The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 212-216, May.
- Götte, Lorenz & Huffman, David B. & Meier, Stephan, 2006. "The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups," IZA Discussion Papers 2020, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- repec:dgr:uvatin:2005078 is not listed on IDEAS
- Holger Strulik, 2008.
"Social composition, social conflict and economic development,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 1145-1170, 07.
- Strulik, Holger, 2006. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen FakultÃ¤t der Leibniz UniversitÃ¤t Hannover dp-350, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Holger Strulik, 2005. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," Discussion Papers 05-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Holger Strulik, 2004. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_018, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Vigdor, Jacob L., 2002. "Interpreting ethnic fragmentation effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-276, April.
- Erik Lindqvist & Robert Östling, 2013.
"Identity and redistribution,"
Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 469-491, June.
- Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
- Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2007.
"Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2006-41, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Güth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria & Ploner, Matteo, 2008. "Social identity and trust--An experimental investigation," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1293-1308, August.
- Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997.
"Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-50, November.
- Easterly, W & Levine, R, 1996. "Africa's Growth Tragedy : Policies and Ethnic Divisions," Papers 536, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- Dominic Rohner, 2008.
"Reputation, Group Structure and Social Tensions,"
HiCN Working Papers
40, Households in Conflict Network.
- John B Davis, 2005.
"Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics,"
Working Papers and Research
0508, Marquette University, Center for Global and Economic Studies and Department of Economics.
- Basu, Kaushik, 2005.
"Racial Conflict and the Malignancy of Identity,"
05-02, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999.
"Reputation and Imperfect Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
238, David K. Levine.
- Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1997.
"Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,"
NBER Working Papers
6009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William & Alesina, Alberto, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," Scholarly Articles 4551797, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank.
- Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
- Lindqvist, Erik, 2008.
"Identity and Redistribution,"
Working Paper Series
735, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- repec:pri:indrel:403 is not listed on IDEAS
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
- Dan Silverman, 2004. "Street Crime And Street Culture," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 761-786, 08.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2011.
"Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 805-855.
- Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2006. "Identity, Morals and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Farzana Afridi & Sherry Xin Li & Yufei Ren, 2010.
"Social Identity and Inequality--The Impact of China’s Hukou System,"
190, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Afridi, Farzana & Li, Sherry Xin & Ren, Yufei, 2012. "Social Identity and Inequality: The Impact of China's Hukou System," IZA Discussion Papers 6417, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Farzana Afridi & Sherry Xin Li & Yufei Ren, 2010. "Social Identity and Inequality: The Impact of China's Hokou System," Working Papers id:3003, eSocialSciences.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2007.
"Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6123, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Wagener, Andreas & Kolmar, Martin, 2011. "Group Identities in Conflicts," Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48694, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.