Why not Africa? -- Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights
AbstractThe paper presents the long-run equilibrium and development dynamics in the neoclassical growth model and a simple model of endogenous growth when property rights are absent. The results are compared to the outcome in a corresponding model economy with secure property rights. The main findings are that there exists a considerable gain in level and growth of consumption from establishing secure property rights, that economic performance without property rights worsens with increasing number of competing groups, and that the existence, or absence of property rights explains conditional convergence.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Hamburg University, Department of Economics in its series Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers with number 19909.
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Von-Melle-Park 5 D-20146 Hamburg
Phone: : +49 (0)40 42838-4674
Fax: +49 (0)40 42838-5546
Web page: http://www.uni-hamburg.de/onTEAM/grafik/1223630633/RePec/ham
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Ines Lindner & Holger Strulik, 2004. "Why not Africa? -- Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(1_2), pages 143-167, 07.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
- Scully, Gerald W, 1988. "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 652-62, June.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Ogaki, Masao & Ostry, Jonathan, 1996.
"Saving Behavior in Low- and Middle-Income Developing Countries: A Comparison,"
6978, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Masao Ogaki & Jonathan D. Ostry & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "Saving Behavior in Low- and Middle-Income Developing Countries: A Comparison," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(1), pages 38-71, March.
- Ogaki, M & Reinhart, C-M, 1995.
"Measuring Intertemporal Substitution : The Role of Durable Goods,"
RCER Working Papers
404, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Masao Ogaki & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1998. "Measuring Intertemporal Substitution: The Role of Durable Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 1078-1098, October.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Ogaki, Masao, 1995. "Measuring intertemporal substitution: The role of durable goods," MPRA Paper 13690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. " Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-41, June.
- Robert E. Hall, 1981.
"Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,"
NBER Working Papers
0720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard B. Freeman & David L. Lindauer, 1999. "Why Not Africa?," NBER Working Papers 6942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atkeson, A. & Ogaki, M., 1991.
"Wealth-Varying Intertemporal Elasticities of Substitution Evidence from Panel and Aggregate Data,"
RCER Working Papers
303, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Atkeson, Andrew & Ogaki, Masao, 1996. "Wealth-varying intertemporal elasticities of substitution: Evidence from panel and aggregate data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 507-534, December.
- Larry E. Jones & Rodolfo Manuelli, 1990. "A Convex Model of Equilibrium Growth," NBER Working Papers 3241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1996. " Social Conflict and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 125-42, March.
- Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April.
- Shimomura, Koji, 1991. "The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 317-338, April.
- Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006.
"Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity,"
Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, 08.
- Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2004. "Insecure Property Rights and Growth: The Roles of Appropriation Costs, Wealth Effects, and Heterogeneity," CESifo Working Paper Series 1253, CESifo Group Munich.
- Strulik, Holger, 2012.
"Poverty, voracity, and growth,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 396-403.
- Tenryu, Yohei, 2013. "The Role of the Private Sector under Insecure Property Rights," MPRA Paper 50727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ines Lindner & Holger Strulik, 2008. "Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(298), pages 244-258, 05.
- Brigitte Desroches & Michael Francis, 2006. "Institutional Quality, Trade, and the Changing Distribution of World Income," Working Papers 06-19, Bank of Canada.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.