Oil and the duration of dictatorships
AbstractThis paper develops a simple model that analyses the relationship between a country?s oil endowment and the duration of its autocratic leader. The dictator uses the rents from oil extraction for both personal gain and to pay-off potential opposition and chooses an optimal level of oil exploitation. A group of kingmakers, on the other side, decides whether to stage a coup d??tat and establish a new dictator. The relationship between oil endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is modulated by the price of oil. Applying an empirical survival model on data for the duration of 106 dictatorships supports the predictions of the theoretical model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 148 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Natural resources; Dictatorship; Political economy; Duration; Q34; D72; H11;
Other versions of this item:
- Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2010. "Oil and the Duration of Dictatorships," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 10-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Crespo Cuaresma, Jesus & Oberhofer, Harald & Raschky, Paul, 2010. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2010-3, University of Salzburg.
- Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, . "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Working Papers 2008-24, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
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