Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse

Contents:

Author Info

  • Katharina Wick

    ()

  • Erwin Bulte

Abstract

A growing empirical literature links natural resource abundance and “pointiness” to impeded economic growth and civil strife. We develop rent seeking and conflict models that capture the most salient features of contests for resource rents, and show how both resource abundance and geographical clustering can be associated with intense contests and sub-optimal economic performance. However, we also show that these relationships are not necessarily monotonous – pointiness can trigger more intense contests but can also facilitate the coordination on peaceful outcomes. Finally we show that contesting resources through violent conflict may yield superior outcomes (from an economy-wide perspective) than contests through rent seeking. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-9010-z
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 128 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 457-476

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:457-476

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  2. Lant Pritchett & Michael Woolcock & Gwen Busby & Jonathan Isham, 2004. "The Varieties of Resource Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0308r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  3. Matthew J. Baker, 2003. "An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 124-173, February.
  4. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  5. Herschel Grossman, 2003. "Fifty-four Forty or Fight," Working Papers 2003-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Bulte, Erwin H & Damania, Richard & Deacon, Robert, 2003. "Resource Abundance, Poverty and Development," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt66z854gv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  7. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  9. Thorvaldur Gylfason & Gylfi Zoega, 2006. "Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of Investment," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1091-1115, 08.
  10. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June.
  11. Hugh Neary, 1997. "A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 373-388, December.
  12. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, 01.
  13. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 130-34, May.
  14. Auty, Richard M., 2001. "The political economy of resource-driven growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 839-846, May.
  15. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. " A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-88, December.
  16. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-73, October.
  17. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
  18. Hotte, Louis & Long, Ngo Van & Tian, Huilan, 2000. "International trade with endogenous enforcement of property rights," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-54, June.
  19. Olsson, Ola & Congdon, Heather, 2003. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Working Papers in Economics 97, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised 30 Oct 2003.
  20. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2 : Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Discussion Paper 1993-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  21. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  22. Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 2001. "The curse of natural resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 827-838, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Al-Ubaydli, Omar, 2012. "Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 137-152.
  2. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Christian Lessmann & Gunther Markwardt, 2013. "Natural-Resource Rents and Internal Conflicts - Can Decentralization Lift the Curse?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4180, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, 2007. "Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2007-15, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Petros G. Sekeris, 2012. "The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World," Working Papers 1213, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  5. Azarhoushang, Behzad & Rukavina, Marko, 2014. "Resource curse: A comparative study," IPE Working Papers 30/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
  6. Oskenbayev, Yessengali & Karimov, Aziz, 2013. "Is Kazakhstan vulnerable to natural resource curse?," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  7. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2006. "Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 5688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Janus, Thorsten, 2012. "Natural resource extraction and civil conflict," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 24-31.
  9. Wick, A.K., 2008. "Conflicts, Development and Natural Resources: An Applied Game Theoretic Approach," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3160797, Tilburg University.
  10. Arezki, Rabah & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2007. "Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned Into a Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Frederick Van der Ploeg, 2010. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3125, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Rabah Arezki & Frederik van der Ploeg, 2007. "Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned Into a Blessing? T+L3479he Role of Trade Policies and Institutions," IMF Working Papers 07/55, International Monetary Fund.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:457-476. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.