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Oil and the Duration of Dictatorships

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  • Jesus Crespo Cuaresma
  • Harald Oberhofer
  • Paul Raschky

Abstract

This paper studies empirically the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of autocratic leaders. A simple theoretical setting shows how the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is mediated by the price of oil. Using a dataset on 106 dictators, our empirical analysis supports the predictions of the theoretical model and indicates that dictators in countries which are relatively better endowed in terms of oil stay longer in office. This result is robust to changes in the definition of dictatorial regimes, as well as to controlling for other economic and political variables.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 10-10.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2010-10

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Keywords: Natural resources; dictatorship; political economy; duration;

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Olja kan gynna diktatorer
    by nonicoclolasos in Nonicoclolasos on 2010-02-17 11:28:45
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Cited by:
  1. Furlan, Benjamin & Gächter, Martin & Krebs, Bob & Oberhofer, Harald, 2012. "Democratization and real exchange rates," Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2012-6, University of Salzburg.
  2. Egil Matsen, Gisle J. Natvik and Ragnar Torvik, 2012. "Petro populism," Working Paper Series 12812, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
  3. Antonio Cabrales & Esther Hauk, 2011. "The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 58-88, March.
  4. Möller, Marie, 2012. "An empirical study of the limits and perspectives of institutional transfers," CIW Discussion Papers 02/2012, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).

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